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Abstract
Researchers in the life sciences often make uniqueness attributions; about branch-
ing events generating new species, the developmental processes generating novel 
traits and the distinctive cultural selection pressures faced by hominins. Yet since 
uniqueness implies non-recurrence, such attributions come freighted with epistemic 
consequences. Drawing on the work of Aviezer Tucker, we show that a common 
reaction to uniqueness attributions is pessimism: both about the strength of candi-
date explanations as well as the ability to even generate such explanations. Look-
ing at two case studies—elephant trunks and human teaching—we develop a more 
optimistic account. As we argue, uniqueness attributions are revisable claims about 
the availability of several different kinds of comparators. Yet even as researchers 
investigate the availability of such comparators, they are able to mobilize complex 
sets of empirical and theoretical tools. Rather than hindering scientific investigation, 
then, we argue that uniqueness attributions often spur the generation of a range of 
epistemic goods.
Keywords Uniqueness · Comparative Biology · Explanation
Introduction
Uniqueness has received little attention in recent philosophy of science. This is sur-
prising given its important role in the life sciences. There it is often claimed that 
events, traits, or lineages are unique; for example, that evolutionary events are con-
tingent (McConwell 2019, Currie 2018), irreversible (Maynard-Smith & Szathmary, 
1995) or idiosyncratic (Wong 2019); that human beings evolve under unique cultural 
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circumstances (Henrich 2015); and that lineages bear unique, novel traits (Wagner 
2014). The metaphysics of evolutionary kinds further suggests an important role for 
uniqueness. The dominant view understands such kinds as individuals: particular 
trajectories deserving of narrative explanation (Hull 1976).
In this paper, we provide an analysis of uniqueness; one that sheds light on the 
nature and role of uniqueness attributions in the life sciences. Though there are met-
aphysical issues in the neighborhood, we focus on the epistemological implications 
of uniqueness attributions. More specifically, our attention focuses on unique trait 
attributions. Unique traits are non-recurrent and as such, limit researcher abilities to 
acquire evidence, test hypotheses and provide explanations concerning them.
These epistemic limitations are most evident in those areas of the life sciences 
that deploy historical explanation. While inheriting well-known problems with his-
torical explanation more generally,1 explanations of uniqueness—the emergence of 
a new species, trait, or kind of evolutionary individual—face additional sources of 
pessimism. After all, if a trait is non-recurrent, then it seems incomparable: other 
lineages won’t possess it. And if this is so, one should be gloomy about the explana-
tory prospects of comparative approaches.
In the face of such pessimism, we point to heterogeneous means and methods 
for gathering evidence and providing explanations in the life sciences. These pro-
vide the foundation for a more optimistic take on the role of uniqueness attributions. 
We build our account by examining when evolutionary researchers make unique-
ness claims and how they then investigate them. Employing two case studies—ele-
phant trunks and human teaching—we show how scientists group together traits into 
contrast classes using criteria of similarity. Affordance similarity groups together 
traits that display qualitative similarities in the affordances they exploit, while evo-
lutionary similarity groups together traits on the basis of similar evolutionary cir-
cumstance. As we argue, there are reasons to be optimistic whichever criterion a 
researcher adopts: non-recurrence does not preclude sophisticated and powerful 
means of evolutionary investigation and explanation.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first, we begin by zeroing in on 
traits as a target of uniqueness attributions in the life sciences (‘The uniqueness of 
what?’), before characterizing the relationship between uniqueness, incomparabil-
ity and pessimism (‘Uniqueness and pessimism in the life sciences’) and discussing 
Aviezer Tucker’s (1998) pessimistic conclusions around uniqueness and explanation 
(‘Tucker on uniqueness’). This stage ends with an analysis that distinguishes two 
broad kinds of comparison (‘Pessimism and comparisons’). These form the basis for 
the second stage of analysis which shifts to look at how uniqueness attributions are 
made in biological practice. Here we introduce some conceptual machinery to make 
sense of the comparative methods at work in the life sciences (‘Reasons for opti-
mism: two case studies’) before examining two case studies—elephant trunks (‘The 
1 Notably, that historical explanations provide mere ‘how possibly’ explanations rather than ‘how actu-
ally’ ones (Dray 1957, Gallie 1964, Ereshefsky & Turner, 2019); that they provide ‘explanation sketches’ 
that lack nomological power (Hempel 1942); or that they lack confirming instances and access to crucial 
information (Collingwood 1936/1976).
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elephant’s trunk’) and teaching in hominins (‘Human teaching’)—with some stock-
taking in between (‘Interlude: selection regimes and evolvability’). These exam-
ples underwrite our argument for a more optimistic take on uniqueness attributions, 
one that we defend from potential complications (‘Human teaching’). As we argue, 
understanding uniqueness attributions sheds light on the comparative strategies at 
work in the life sciences by showing how researchers wield a variety of tools to get a 
handle on the spectacular and peculiar outputs of the evolutionary process.
Some initial caveats. First, while we offer some examples (in ‘The uniqueness of 
what?’) demonstrating the widespread interest in uniqueness, we do not aim to pro-
vide an exhaustive survey of all the areas or topics in the life sciences where unique-
ness attributions might be made. Second, and as noted above, ‘uniqueness’ is only 
infrequently an explicit target in life sciences research. This is in part because the 
term isn’t a common one in biological nomenclature. It may also reflect the fact that 
researchers have developed various strategies for situating putatively unique traits in 
comparison classes, as we demonstrate below. Our analysis, then, is not focused on 
explicating the term, but instead focuses on how scientists grapple with non-recur-
rent events, employ strategies and tools to make sense of them, and justify the expla-
nations they give.
This analytical strategy comes with potential limitations. The epistemic problems 
of uniqueness we discuss may depend on the particular investigative aims and meth-
ods at hand. In this paper, we focus on the methods of comparative biology. None-
theless, we suspect our account of uniqueness attributions carries over into other 
areas of the life sciences. We also suspect that the broadly optimistic stance towards 
uniqueness attributions can be extended beyond the life sciences. We leave these 
broader explorations, however, for later work.
The uniqueness of what?
When researchers in the life sciences claim that a creature is unique, what do they 
mean? Though one might make such claims in terms of ‘events’, ‘processes’, or 
‘lineages’, we will understand such claims to be about ‘trait’ uniqueness. To see 
why, consider a puzzle that arises when such claims are situated in the context of 
‘lineages’.
At a first pass, calling a lineage ‘unique’ seems either trivial or confused. Accord-
ing to evolutionary systematics, every lineage is the result of a unique branching 
event. And yet at the same time, every lineage traces its ancestry to a common ances-
tor. Does this mean that all lineages are unique? That no known lineages are? If the 
former, uniqueness attributions are uninformative, simply restating results from sys-
tematics; if the latter, such attributions seem spooky, suggesting unique events fall 
outside the remit of contemporary scientific understanding. This sets up a challenge 
for any account of biological uniqueness: identify notions which are neither trivial 
or uninformative, nor confused or spooky.
Happily, shifting the context of uniqueness attributions from lineages to traits 
answers the challenge. One can understand a trait’s uniqueness in terms of compari-
sons indexed to particular descriptions. Are elephant trunks unique? This depends 
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on, first, how one describes the trait at hand. As we’ll see, described as probos-
cises—an evolutionary development of the mammalian snout—trunks may be com-
pared to the tapir’s flexible snout. But given more specific descriptions, trunks may 
belong to elephants alone. Second, uniqueness depends on how one situates the trait 
phylogenetically. Trunks are not unique to Loxodonta africana: they are also pos-
sessed by forest elephants in African and Indian elephants (as well as various extinct 
Elephantidae). And so asking whether trunks are unique requires the right phyloge-
netic scope. Nonetheless, unique trait attributions are neither trivial nor uninforma-
tive: after fixing descriptors and comparators, uniqueness is an empirical question 
and—as we’ll see in the next section—one with epistemic upshots.2
Interestingly, we think understanding uniqueness attributions as being about traits 
allows one to understand similar claims made in terms of lineages, events, or pro-
cesses; a lineage is unique just in case it possesses a unique trait (mutatis mutandis 
for events and processes).
In addition to clearing up conceptual issues, understanding uniqueness attribu-
tions in this way has empirical benefits, allowing for fruitful connections to work 
on evolutionary novelty and innovation in the evolutionary developmental biology 
literature. Nonetheless it is worth distinguishing our target and approach from this 
neighboring literature on two counts. First, ‘novelty’ and ‘trait-uniqueness’ need 
not overlap. The elephant’s proboscis is likely a novelty in that lineage, but it does 
not follow from this that it is unique if tapirs possess them as well. Second, philo-
sophical discussion of novelty has focused on explicating the concept and its role 
in evolutionary theory (Pigliucci 2008; Brigandt & Love, 2010, Wagner 2014). By 
contrast, we are interested in the epistemic consequences of uniqueness attributions 
and how they shape research in the life sciences more generally. While we suspect 
that useful connections between our arguments and that literature may be drawn, we 
leave drawing these for later work.
Uniqueness and pessimism in the life sciences
When researchers make uniqueness attributions their claims are decidedly not vapid 
or spooky: they take these attributions to have important epistemological conse-
quences. Consider an illustrative example. Smith and Wood, (2017) argue that 
unique hominin traits block epistemic access to the evolutionary past. They begin by 
defining uniqueness:
2 It does not follow that all uniqueness attributions will be compelling: defining a trait in an extremely 
fine-grained or coarse-grained manner will trade off against pragmatic demands and empirical fecundity. 
This means that while uniqueness attributions are relative to the interests of researchers, this is epistemi-
cally benign. As we describe in more detail below, scientists investigate putatively unique traits at multi-
ple levels of description. This is a deliberate strategy to identify areas of epistemic traction. Yet whether 
or not a trait is unique at any particular level of description is not settled in advance, but is a revisable 
claim subject to empirical investigation.
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We define a feature or trait to be “unique” when an investigator concludes that 
there are no comparative data against which the features can be evaluated, 
interpreted, or contrasted… By definition, just as an historical event is blocked 
from experimental evaluation, a unique feature, trait or event is blocked from 
direct comparative evaluation (673).
Smith and Wood connect uniqueness attributions to the prevailing comparative 
methods in the life sciences. Can the trait be juxtaposed with other traits? Is hominin 
tool use, say, meaningfully comparable with tool use in corvids?3Or in in our fel-
low primates? Smith and Wood argue that many hominin traits have no true com-
parisons and this in turn limits what we can learn about them—stressing the vexing 
situation of hominins and their distinctive complex of novel traits.4 The thought is 
that because one cannot set traits in a comparative context, one thus lacks epistemic 
access to them.
[researchers are tempted] to pose and try to answer, tempting but unrealistic 
research questions. There is much we would like to know about human evo-
lutionary history, but wanting to know something does not make it knowable 
(ibid, 677).
We take Smith and Wood to be giving a particularly clear example of a fairly 
widespread position in the life sciences: that because a trait is unique, it cannot be 
placed in a comparative context and thus one lacks the resources available to gener-
ate robust scientific knowledge. Similar logic underwrites the “N = 1” problem in 
astrobiology (Powell 2020) and the discussions around ‘singletons’ in macroevolu-
tionary contingency (Vermeij 2006; Losos 2017; Wong 2020). In such cases, the 
non-recurrence of some trait (tool-use, carbon-based life, distinctive Dinosaurian 
traits) underwrites pessimism about epistemic access and explicability. We think this 
epistemic pessimism is widespread in the life sciences—even if, as we noted above, 
researchers do not often use the term ‘unique’ for various nomenclatural reasons.
The discussions of this and the previous section provides the orientation for the 
remainder of our paper. We’re interested in unique trait attributions; substantive 
empirical claims that are neither vapid nor non-naturalistic. Moreover, such attri-
butions have epistemological consequences: unique targets are problematic because 
they are non-recurrent and non-recurrent events cannot be put in comparative con-
text. Lastly, researchers across the life sciences often adopt a pessimistic epistemic 
stance, questioning whether epistemic goods can be generated from a study of non-
recurrent traits.
3 We have used ‘hominin’ throughout this paper to refer to the group of species consisting of modern 
humans and their immediate ancestors following the split from Pan. Prior to recent changes in taxonomic 
nomenclature, ‘hominid’ was used with the same extension. Quotes below that employ ‘hominid’ should 
be understood in this way.
4 Human uniqueness is most often discussed in the philosophical literature in terms of a ‘human nature’. 
For recent work surveying this topic, see: Kronfeldner (2018) and the essays in Hannon and Lewens, 
(2018). For a recent historical account that charts twentieth-century claims of human uniqueness, see: 
Milam (2019)
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Tucker on uniqueness
What is the problem of non-recurrence? Our jumping off-point looks to the work of 
Tucker (1998), who defines something as unique when it lacks comparisons and thus 
(so he claims) lacks what is needed for justified scientific understanding. Although 
he focuses generally on ‘events’, the account generalizes to the study of any non-
recurrent entity, like traits:5
“There are no acceptable scientific theories that can explain unique events 
because unique events: Occur once and only once. Their significant proper-
ties or parameters, specified in the topic description of the why-question, are 
either:
a. Not shared by any other event, apart from spatiotemporal location and self 
identity (or it is unknowable whether they are shared by other events). Or
b. Too complex or chaotic for effective comparison with other events.” 
(Tucker 1998, 65)
This calls for unpacking. Tucker employs van Fraassen’s pragmatic account of 
explanation (1980). This takes explanations as answers to why-questions. These 
have topic-descriptions that highlight aspects (properties, parameters) of the target 
to be explained. To anticipate later discussions, one example might be the question 
‘why are elephant trunks such remarkably flexible, multi-use organs?’ In answer-
ing this question, aspects of elephant behaviour and anatomy would be highlighted, 
perhaps behaviours such as the trunk ‘hand-shake’ greeting. By contrast, a question 
such as ‘why did elephant trunks evolve?’ would highlight aspects of elephant evolu-
tionary history, properties of elephant ancestors and the environment in which these 
populations evolved. Thus, one upshot of Tucker’s view (which we fully endorse) is 
that uniqueness attributions are sensitive to description. As we’ve argued, a trait’s 
uniqueness depends in part on how it is described. The elephant’s trunk might be 
unique vis-à-vis proboscises, but it certainly isn’t unique vis-à-vis having nostrils.
Tucker’s analysis highlights two ways in which an event can be incomparable. 
The first occurs when some features are only tokened by the event in question; such 
features are theirs alone. Elephant trunks (properly described) might be held by ele-
phants and elephants alone. Alternatively, comparisons may be lacking because the 
inductively salient features of events are inaccessible. On the former, events are (so 
far as can be known) non-recurrent; on the latter, there may be comparable events, 
5 Does Tucker’s argument generalize? A concerned referee worried that Tucker’s “events” might not 
apply to “traits”. We think it does so straightforwardly. First, occurrences of traits are a kind of event. 
Unless there is a distinction to be drawn between ‘events’ generally and ‘trait-events’ specifically—some-
thing we are skeptical of—this worry does not get off the ground. Second, Tucker’s analysis doesn’t turn 
on talk of events, processes, or traits, but rather on circumstances where investigative targets lack com-
parators. And as we have shown, researchers in the life sciences take unique traits to be such targets.
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but we lack the means (because of epistemic or practical limitations) to discern 
them.
Tucker’s account is neither vapid nor spooky. And he is clear on the epistemic 
consequences of uniqueness: it rules out scientific explanation.6 The equivalence of 
uniqueness with incomparability and the corresponding pessimistic conclusion raise 
questions as to how researchers in the life sciences could ever investigate putatively 
unique events. Yet researchers do investigate such events—and seem to be success-
ful at doing so.
Pessimism and comparisons
Tucker, we think, gets a lot right about uniqueness: uniqueness is sensitive to 
description and the epistemic limitations of uniqueness result from difficulties in 
drawing comparisons. Still, we think that Tucker’s stance is too pessimistic. His 
analysis shifts too quickly from noting incomparability (in his sense) to the impos-
sibility of a scientific work on unique events.
So what counts as a comparison? We think Tucker’s appeal to the concept is 
ambiguous. Borrowing from Currie (2018), let’s consider two kinds of compari-
sons. The first identifies comparisons by tracing causal pathways. Elephants, for 
instance, interact with their environment: knocking down trees, feeding, migrating 
and so forth. These causal connections can empirically inform researchers about the 
critter at hand: trees broken in this way and at this height are evidence of recent 
elephant activity. Such causal pathways can be traced at greater or lesser spatiotem-
poral scales. Specific elephants might have idiosyncratic ways of clearing tracks and 
these can serve as signals for their individual activity. More zoomed out, the way 
that different elephant populations cut a trail can be very different. Zoomed out even 
further, one can compare how elephants are related to each other and to other line-
ages via causal lines of ancestry—homologies—which may be used to underwrite 
comparisons between and within taxa. Here researchers compare states of the target 
itself at different times; sometimes directly, while at other times, as inferred by their 
effects on the world. The second kind identifies comparisons with tokens of some 
type. Here, although there is no relevant causal chain linking comparisons, they 
count as such in virtue of being instances of the same type of event or process. If 
both elephants and tapirs have proboscises and these evolved (more or less) indepen-
dently, then one has two instances of the evolution of the proboscis type. Together 
these instances can underwrite generalizations about the evolution of the trait.
These two kinds of comparisons generate different epistemic goods. Causal-path-
way comparisons provide information about particular features of the target while 
event-type comparisons furnish information about regularities; causal-pathway 
6 Tucker discusses several strategies that scientists adopt in light of apparent uniqueness, emphasizing 
in particular mechanistic strategies which might reveal underlying commonalities after all. We welcome 
this move and note that it shares similarities with the strategy we adopt below. However, unlike Tucker, 
we take this strategy to undercut the equivalence between uniqueness and incomparability.
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comparisons illuminate by tracing causal consequences back to features of the target 
while event-type comparisons evidence generalizations (laws, models) applicable to 
the target. Particular instances of evidence might not neatly fall exclusively into one 
of these categories—comparisons will often play both roles—but the distinction is 
important and plays a key role in our positive account.
Tucker’s definition of uniqueness relies solely on event-type comparisons. 
Although Tucker is rightly dismissive of Deductive-Nomological accounts of expla-
nation, he nonetheless retains the idea that explanation requires some kind of modal 
force—one needs to know how the target may have behaved differently—and to do 
so one needs comparisons capable of informing generalizations. As such, he requires 
that explanations involve generalized models of dynamics and behaviour.
by definition, [unique] events exclude the possibility of other events that can 
be relevant for confirming the theoretical backgrounds that can participate in 
their explanation because: Unique events are not recurrent; their significant 
properties are either not shared by any other event or it is impossible to know 
whether other events share them; or they are too chaotic and complex for effec-
tive comparison with other events. Explanations of unique events are radically 
underdetermined because any theoretical background that is relevant for their 
explanation is underdetermined. (Tucker 1998, 66)
‘Theoretical backgrounds’ provide the modal force required to understand how 
the target may have turned out differently under counterfactual circumstances—and 
comparisons are required to establish these backgrounds. On our reading of Tucker, 
something is unique just when it lacks event-type comparisons.7
Tucker’s account is epistemically pessimistic in an important sense, but non-
committal in another. Unique events are beyond the reach of acceptable scientific 
explanation because such explanations require the application of justified models of 
event regularities. Yet these can only be achieved by examining relevantly similar 
events and without any such events, regularities cannot be identified or confirmed. 
He is, however, non-committal about when and if any particular targets are in fact 
unique in his sense: the extension of ‘uniqueness’ might be empty. As we’ll see, our 
disagreement with Tucker, then, turns on what counts as a comparator and what is 
required to provide an ‘acceptable scientific theory’.
This pessimism extends to the generation of explanations. Tucker suggests that 
unique events generate explanatory underdetermination: researchers lack sufficient 
comparisons to empirically support the regularities underwriting our explanations.8 
Smith and Wood’s pessimism too can be understood along these lines. They deny 
8 This kind of underdetermination is distinct from more familiar notions where researchers lack suffi-
cient evidence to distinguish between competing hypotheses (Turner 2004; Tucker 2011; Currie 2018 
chapter 4).
7 We note that both ‘uniqueness’ and ‘non-recurrence’ can come in degrees, depending on how finely 
specified the relevant target is and how much ‘wiggle-room’ there is for something to count as a compar-
ator. At some level of description, the mass extinction event 66 million years was unique and non-recur-
rent. But at another level of description it is part of a set of five (perhaps soon six!) mass-extinctions: it is 
recurrent.
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that researchers can gain empirical traction on hominin evolution because, on their 
view, hominins are the bearers of multiple unique traits that block researchers from 
marshalling comparisons. Where Tucker makes a conceptual point about the epis-
temic consequences of uniqueness, Smith and Wood argue that hominin traits are in 
fact unique and thus not amenable to scientific discovery or explanation.
We think this pessimism moves to far too fast. There is, we suggest, plenty of 
room for more optimistic takes. At least within the life sciences, researchers lever-
age causal-pathway comparisons to generate knowledge about the salient properties, 
mechanisms and processes at work in unique events. And overlapping with these 
are coarse-grained event-type comparisons that can capture and explain inductively 
relevant clusters. Together, these strategies can yield complex, highly tailored expla-
nations of target events.
Reasons for optimism: two case studies
Scientists are skilled at finding causal regularities in the world, leveraging and inte-
grating both causal-pathway and event-type comparisons. The regularities they dis-
cover are defeasible but inductively salient. In general, researchers adopt various cri-
teria of similarity in order to import tools, models and methods from elsewhere in 
evolutionary biology and beyond. Such criteria of similarity help identify clusters of 
properties presumed to be inductively salient. These presumptive clusters can then 
create suitable contrast classes against which hypotheses, models and explanations 
can be tested.
As we demonstrate below, life scientists use similarity criteria to construct com-
parison classes and apply tools, methods and regularities to putatively unique traits. 
We highlight two such criteria here: affordance similarity and evolutionary similar-
ity. Both guide researchers in the construction of contrast classes in different ways. 
Affordance similarity highlights similarities between organismic behavioural reper-
toires and features in the world; evolutionary similarity the extent to which organis-
mic traits are presumed to be similar and subject to similar evolutionary processes. 
No doubt there will be other kinds of similarity that biologists focus on—the com-
plexity and messiness of life begets a complex and messy set of scientific approaches 
and categories—but nonetheless affordance and evolutionary similarity are critical 
notions for understanding how scientists tackle putative uniqueness in the compara-
tive cases we’re focused on.
Importantly, we further break down evolutionary similarity into two distinct cri-
teria, each of which furnishes a characterization of uniqueness. The first, similarity 
in selection regimes highlights how shared selection pressures can generate similar 
traits. On this criterion, uniqueness is equated with being a statistical outlier: traits 
at an extreme end of a statistical distribution that result from severe and/or persis-
tent selection regimes. The second, evolvability similarity, groups together traits 
on the basis of dispositional tendencies of lineages to evolve in similar ways. Here, 
unique traits are the result of path-dependent cascades. Briefly, one can understand 
a ‘path-dependent cascade’ using machinery developed in the contingency litera-
ture. Desjardins (2011a, b) defines path dependence as holding when an outcome is 
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probabilistically dependent on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of specific events 
along a causal pathway, which he distinguishes from dependence on initial condi-
tions. For the latter, where one begins matters, for the former, what happens along 
the way matters. A trait is the result of a path-dependent cascade when an evolution-
ary trajectory diverges from relevant contrasts in exploring a different region of evo-
lutionary space as a result of specific events along its evolutionary pathway.
We develop and clarify much of this machinery in our discussion of the elephant’s 
trunk. As we conclude, whether the trunk is best understood as unique in the sense 
of being a statistical outlier or a path-dependent cascade is still very much up for 
grabs in the empirical literature. We then turn to human teaching. Here we suggest 
that accounts attempting to characterize human beings as mere statistical outliers is 
on shaky ground; there seems to be increasing evidence that human teaching—as 
well as several other capacities—is most fruitfully understood as the outcome of a 
path-dependent cascade.
The elephant’s trunk
Elephants are remarkable. Originating approximately forty million years ago, the 
lineage quickly evolved the basic pachyderm model: large statures, big brains and, 
of course, trunks.
Trunks are powerful and dextrous. They can be used to lift logs over 300kgs 
as well as to “perform amazingly delicate functions, such as picking up a peanut, 
cracking it open with the tip on the back side of the trunk, blowing the shell away 
and eating the kernel” (Shoshani 1998, 487). Not used solely to manipulate objects, 
elephants also employ their trunks to ‘snorkel’ while submerged; to perform social 
functions such as a ‘trunk-shake’ greeting; and to manufacture tools. Are trunks 
unique? Answering this question requires both describing trunks and situating them 
in comparative contexts.
Often, scientists leverage similarity in affordances to group together similar crea-
tures. Originating with Gibson (2015/1986), affordances are what the environment 
“offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson 
2015/1986, 119). Affordances involve a relation between an organism and specific 
features of its environments: the media in which it survives, the surfaces with which 
it interacts and the active behaviour of other goal-directed critters (ibid. 122–127). 
Building on the work of contemporary ecological psychologists, we understand 
affordances broadly as ‘opportunities for behaviour’: suites of relationships con-
stituted by repertoires of possible organismic behaviours and features of the world 
exploited by the organism in pursuit of goals. (Chemero 2009, 151; Walsh 2015). 
Affordances, then, are relationships between an organismic relatum (a behavioural 
and phenotypic repertoire) and an environmental relatum (the set of features exploit-
able by such behaviours).9 On our view, there are often constructive relationships 
9 Affordances depend on traits. Without delving too deeply into metaphysical issues, one can think of 
them, along with features, as INUS conditions for realizing affordances (Mackie 1965): specific traits and 
features are insufficient but non-redundant parts of an unnecessary but sufficient condition for exploiting 
something as, say, graspable or liftable or edible. Construing affordances in this way is meant to capture 
the idea that an organism’s behavioural repertoire might support a wide range of affordances, but does 
1 3
Uniqueness in the life sciences: how did the elephant get its… Page 11 of 24 37
between these relata: just as organisms are shaped by their environment, so too are 
environments actively shaped by organisms.
How might this strategy apply to the trunk? Consider Milewski and Dierenfeld, 
(2013), who group the elephant trunk into a broad trait category they call probos-
cises: “flexible, tubular extension of the joint narial and upper labial musculature 
that is, at least in part, used to grasp food” (85). This identifies similarities as a spe-
cific kind of affordance (grasping) associated with a specific morphological struc-
ture (roughly, snouts). So understood, elephants are not alone in having a proboscis. 
Tapirs have them too. Like elephants, tapir proboscises are flexible, tubular narial 
projections used to grasp food. Nonetheless, there are significant differences in the 
extent to which their proboscises facilitate grasping.
Elephant trunks can grasp and manipulate objects with two distinct kinds of 
opposable grips. The first involves the familiar curling of the trunk around objects. 
This uses the ventral side of a trunk to create an opposable surface, akin to the way 
that fingers curl around the handles of mugs. The second kind of grasping is more 
striking. Elephant trunks have enlarged projections called ‘trunk tip fingers’, which 
they can use to carry out fine-grained grasping and manipulation like nut-cracking 
and paintbrush-holding (Rasmussen and Munger, 1996).10 Contrast these capabili-
ties with those of tapirs. Their proboscises are more akin to a flexible shovel: able to 
move food toward the mouth, but lacking opposability and thus with only minimal 
affordances for true grasping. So, although both tapir and elephants have some simi-
larities in affordances, the elephant trunk is nonetheless distinctive.
Many researchers employ affordances as a means of crafting hypotheses about 
evolutionary history; similar affordances may be the result of similar evolution-
ary circumstances. But how one locates that similarity generates different kinds of 
uniqueness attributions and different kinds of explanations and inferences.
Let’s compare two evolutionary narratives concerning elephant trunks.
The first narrative links the evolution of the trunk to a common adaptive trend 
among large mammalian herbivores; namely, the expansion of soft mouth parts 
(Pretorius et al. 2016). As herbivores increase in size, they need to consume more 
food. Yet while bigger mouths afford bigger bites in absolute terms, the relative bite 
size and quality of these bites decreases: for both browsers and grazers, larger bites 
risk consuming more of the fibrous parts of plants (stems and twigs) and less of the 
nutritive parts (leaves). As a result of this, large mammalian herbivores have evolved 
a range of strategies for boosting feed quality by enlarging their soft mouth parts 
(lips, tongues, narial extensions). These increase the quantity of food per bite while 
providing the means for fine-grained selection of foodstuffs. The moose’s prehensile 
upper lip, for instance, allows them to strip leaves from branches. A similar version 
10 Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) have a single, dorsal projection, whereas African elephants (Lox-
odonta africana and cyclotis) have both a dorsal projection and a ventral projection.
not do so invariably, because specific features might not (or may no longer) be found in the critter’s envi-
ronment. An elephant’s trunk can lift objects that weigh in excess of 300 kg—but only if there are such 
objects in the environment to be lifted.
Footnote 9 (continued)
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of this strategy is the long, prehensile tongue of giraffes. Perhaps the trunk is simply 
an exaggerated outcome of similar selection pressures.
On this narrative, the trunk’s evolution is an extreme version of a more general 
evolutionary trend, resulting from a scaling relationship among body size, bite size, 
bite quality and length of soft mouth parts; trunks provide similar sets of affordances 
to giraffe tongues and moose lips. Nonetheless, the trunk is still unique in a sense: 
it is a statistical outlier. The statistical pressures that operates on large mammals 
were merely stronger, or operated for longer, on the elephant. To get to an elephant’s 
trunk, one simply needs to begin with a large mammal—a tapir, say—and ‘turn evo-
lution’s crank’: sufficient selection pressure for increased mouth parts opens the path 
to trunks.
Let’s turn to an alternate account. On this second evolutionary narrative, ele-
phants evolved in a strikingly divergent way from other ungulates. This narrative 
begins by situating proto-elephants in aquatic or semi-aquatic environments. This 
isn’t so outlandish as it may seem, as some of the elephant’s closest living relatives 
are the sea-cows (manatees and dugongs). On this ‘aquatic elephant’ hypothesis, 
what drove trunk evolution was not grasping food but snorkelling: in the aquatic 
environments in which they found themselves, it was adaptive to move submerged 
through water. It was only later that the trunk was co-opted for increased grasping 
functionality.
On this account, there is no easy route from a tapir-like trunk to an elephant’s 
trunk: the evolutionary path leading to elephant trunks was shaped by a distinct set 
of selective pressures that required not only specific starting conditions to get off 
the ground, but also further events downstream. By this hypothesis, both specific 
proto-elephant traits and a semi- or fully-aquatic environment, along with the later 
co-option of these traits in a terrestrial niche, were required to evolve the highly 
plastic, multi-purpose organ. If this latter account is right, then although one might 
class both elephants and other mammals together, one nonetheless cannot use tapirs 
(or other large ungulates) as models for the elephant’s evolution, nor can one take 
the elephant as the extreme end of an evolutionary trajectory that tapirs are poten-
tially traversing. This is because, on this account, trunks are the outcome of a path-
dependent cascade. Trunk evolution was dependent on multiple events: elephants 
having particular morphology, being located in (semi-) aquatic environments and so 
on.
If something like the first narrative is right, then elephant trunks are unique not 
because of the kind of selection pressures they encountered, but because the persis-
tence and strength of selection pressures generated a trait at the extreme end of a 
statistical distribution. Being unique in this sense does not warrant pessimism: there 
are bountiful event-type comparisons to other mammals that underwent similar evo-
lutionary journeys. If the latter narrative is right, then there are no event-type com-
parisons: no other lineage has pursued the same evolutionary trajectory. This might 
warrant some pessimism, for reasons discussed by Tucker above. Nonetheless, one 
is able to narrow down possible causes by using causal-pathway comparisons: by 
looking at phylogenetic neighbours and by employing rich sources of paleobot-
anic, paleoclimatic and paleontological evidence. So even here, there is reason to be 
optimistic.
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Interlude: selection regimes and evolvability
There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from this case study. First, it is a 
common strategy to lump together entities on the basis of inductive similarity. And 
as the above shows, researchers have a wide range of tools for lumping together 
putatively unique events into groups with similar enough comparators to warrant 
the application of more general causal regularities. One way of lumping employs 
causal-pathway comparisons. In this regard and despite their uniqueness, elephant 
researchers are in an enviable epistemic situation as compared to those studying 
other lineages:
Unlike researchers who study dinosaurs and have to rely on distant living rela-
tives, such as crocodiles and birds for indirect comparison, students of Probos-
cidea are fortunate to have living models with which to compare and contrast 
the extinct taxa directly. This advantage should not be underestimated, because 
knowledge of the living species helps one to interpret observations of extinct 
forms and vice versa (Shoshani et al. 1998, 487)
Shoshani’s point is that those studying some extinct lineages (dinosaurs, for 
instance) have problematic causal-pathways comparisons—birds and crocodilians 
are problematically divergent from dinosaurs—but Proboscidea have bountiful such 
comparisons: namely, currently existing species. So even to the extent that elephant 
researchers lack event-type comparisons (more on this below), there are bountiful 
causal-pathway comparisons. This rich information allows researchers explore the 
range of variation in relevant contrast classes, provides statistical access to models 
of their behaviour, physiology and so forth and allows for the testing of evolution-
ary narratives. One can even identify homologous relationships between extant and 
extinct elephants and draw on parallel evolution within the clade.
A second set of lessons comes from noting some of the differences in epistemic 
strategy—and epistemic consequences—that come from applying one or the other of 
the evolutionary similarity criteria. Rather than focus on providing a fully detailed 
picture of the morphology and affordances of the trunk (underpinning, for instance, 
snorkelling, nut-cracking and social greetings) Milewski and Dierenfeld,  (2013) use 
affordance-similarity to motivate an evolutionary narrative that unifies elephants, 
tapirs and other extinct proboscis-wielding critters. This narrative moves from a 
causal-pathway comparison—based on similarity in ecological circumstance—to an 
event-type comparison based around similar adaptive strategy. As we showed, Pre-
torius et al. claim that the elephant can be fruitfully compared to other large-bodied 
mammalian herbivores: the elephant trunk can be situated along a distribution of 
adaptively similar traits that link body size, relative availability and quality of food 
and the size of soft mouth parts.11
11 There is a rich epistemic discussion to be had concerning how satisfying we should find explanations 
like Pretorius et al.’s: under what conditions should we find explanations at such extremely abstract levels 
of detail, when applied to complex and putatively unique traits acceptable? For better or worse, we leave 
this discussion for later work.
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Two points are worth making regarding this strategy. First, although these moves 
generate explanations by unifying different species into a shared (if abstract) evolu-
tionary trajectory or set of affordances, the unity at work is not a broad ‘super-empir-
ical’ virtue that one might use to decide between competing explanations (Church-
land 1985; Kitcher 1981, 1989). Instead, the strategy attempts to highlight deep 
causal regularities between evolving systems and environments, with abstraction 
facilitating the identification and evidencing of such regularities (Strevens 2008). 
Second, the two evolutionary similarity criteria identify different kinds of regulari-
ties and thus establish different kinds of uniqueness attributions. They do so in part 
because the contrast classes are established using different kinds of similarity.
This can be seen by comparing Pretorius et. al’s narrative to the ‘aquatic ele-
phant’ hypothesis. This latter hypothesis groups together comparators on the basis 
of presumed similarity in evolvability—the complex dispositional properties of lin-
eages to explore evolutionary space (Brown 2014)—with phylogenetic proximity 
often serving as a proxy measure. On this account, uniqueness attributions point to 
specific evolutionary events as explanations for why an evolutionary trajectory—
diverging from those of its comparators—could result in the trait in question. Such 
divergences are by their nature highly path-dependent and can involve coordinated, 
multi-factorial cascades of changes.
When it comes to the aquatic elephant hypothesis, one can’t just turn the crank—
increasing the magnitude of the same kind of selection pressure—and expect to 
get an elephant trunk from the tapir-like ancestor. Specific, contingent and path-
dependent relationships among resource distribution, geography and phylogeny are 
required. Yet when it comes to the ‘soft-mouth-part-hypothesis’ one can just turn the 
crank: as ungulate herbivores increase in size, their comparative bite size decreases, 
as does the food quality per bite. Increasing the size of the soft mouth part miti-
gates both of these costs. Under these latter conditions, elephant trunks would not be 
divergent—they are just what happens when one turns the crank long enough. This 
suggests two upshots: affordance uniqueness does not entail non-recurrence and as 
a result, affordance uniqueness does not imply a lack of event-type comparisons (as 
they can be unified with others by being a statistical outlier).
Whether the elephant trunk is best explained as a statistical outlier or the result 
of a path-dependent cascade is up for grabs. We know of no work that contrasts 
the two as candidate evolutionary hypotheses. It might even be that components of 
the two explanations might be needed: it could be that the elephant trunk was ini-
tially enlarged as a response to the increasing size of elephant frames, only later to 
develop along an idiosyncratic evolutionary trajectory.
But let us turn now to consider how our account fares when dealing with a puta-
tively unique trait in a paradigmatically unique lineage: teaching in human beings.
Human teaching
There is no doubt that Homo sapiens have a range of unique traits. The bipedal 
gait of humans allows their hands to be free for dextrous manipulations; the 
human larynx and cranial morphology supports the production of complex and 
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fine-grained vocalizations; and their cognitive machinery supports abilities to 
produce complex, multi-step tools. For all comparative psychologists have identi-
fied similar traits in other lineages, no other critter uses their traits in such a flex-
ible, plastic way (Premack 2010). Indeed, many human affordances result from a 
highly plastic cognitive system together with capacities for culture, which have 
supported the emergence of a bewildering range of norms, practices and technol-
ogies which enlarge both human behavioural repertoires and the features to which 
humans are sensitive.
A central trait supporting the transmission and proliferation of such cultural 
traditions is the human capacity for teaching. The capacity for highly intentional, 
guided, information and skill transfer turbo-charged cultural evolution by amplifying 
the reliance on conspecifics for acquiring sufficient resources, producing the req-
uisite technologies and passing along specialized skills (Sterelny 2012; Tomasello 
2014; Henrich 2015). On these accounts, the human capacity for teaching is key 
to explaining the evolutionary success and persistence of hominins, as well as the 
extraordinary cultural diversity our species exhibits.
We saw above Smith and Wood’s pessimism about empirical access to the evo-
lutionary history of hominins. As we suggested, this pessimism is about the lack of 
event-type comparisons. But we have since argued that affordance uniqueness does 
not entail the lack of event-type comparisons—nor that a lack of event-type compar-
isons hinders the application of tools, the collection of evidence and the furnishing 
of hypotheses that make use of causal-pathway explanations. So, how then should 
we understand teaching’s evolutionarily uniqueness? As with the elephant trunk, 
there are two broad strategies by which researchers attempt to understand the puta-
tive uniqueness of human teaching.
The first strategy trades on the idea that humans are statistical outliers of a more 
general evolutionary trend. As we saw with elephants, such accounts lump together 
lineages on the basis of a presumptive cluster of projective properties. Here, the 
lumping occurs on the back of a broad functional characterisation of teaching. For 
instance, Hoppitt et al. (2008; cf. Caro and Hauser,   1992) define teaching as: “… 
any behaviour that is adapted to the purpose of transmitting knowledge and skills 
to other individuals, regardless of the proximate mechanisms involved” (489). On 
this account, the behaviours and capacities gathered together under the label ‘teach-
ing’ represent a suite of solutions to adaptive problems that different species solve in 
more or less efficient manners. Humans, on this understanding, merely outperform 
other species:
I anticipate human teaching is at the extreme end of the distribution of teach-
ing and that, like other apparent exceptions that in fact prove the rule, explain-
ing teaching in humans will inform our understanding of teaching across spe-
cies. (Kline 2015, 56)
These accounts adopt a coarse-grained functional schematic: if one animal (the 
tutor) modifies its behaviour when in the presence of another (the pupil) in such a 
way that (i) no benefit is gained by the tutor; (ii) the likelihood of the pupil adopting 
the behaviour increases, then the tutor is teaching. With this in hand, researchers are 
able to deduce the kinds of selection pressures that might produce teaching and as 
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a consequence, to apply similar kinds of models and reasoning across the contrast 
class.
On this functional notion, meerkat teaching shows up as being surprisingly simi-
lar to human teaching; scorpion hunting being the prime example. Meerkat ‘helpers’ 
provision their young with scorpions in distinct stages—dead, stingless and fully 
functional—in a way that is indexed to the learner’s age (Thornton and McAuliffe, 
2006; 2008). This allows the inexperienced to learn the subtle art of scorpion-dis-
patching in stages. Such teaching fits the functional schematic: if one wants to eat 
a scorpion, biting off its stinger and passing it to a young meerkat is not beneficial 
to the helper (the first requirement) and a slow, staged introduction to the dangerous 
business certainly increases the chances of the novice to learn how to perform it (the 
second requirement).
Hoppitt et al. (2008) use the functional schematic to argue for a general model 
of teaching evolution. They focus on the role of ‘inadvertent social learning’—
basically, the ability to learn through proximity and salience cues made or left by 
conspecifics—arguing that selective regimes could create an advantage for tutors 
to facilitate the leaving of cues and index these in ways that facilitate successful 
learning. This seems plausible. As meerkats are extremely cooperative, with mutual-
alarm signalling and alloparenting, having reliable and well-fed guards would be 
advantageous. Hoppitt et  al. further suggest that such selective regimes are likely 
to come about when mere inadvertent social learning is ineffective for learning the 
behaviour. Here too the meerkat case fits. Inadvertent social learning might allow 
naïve meerkats to identify scorpions as a salient food resource, but just this piece 
of information is likely to be insufficient for the acquisition of requisite skills, since 
trial and error learning is a terrible way of learning to hunt venomous scorpions. 
The claim, then, is that if a particular behaviour on the part of the tutor creates con-
ditions that encourage the successful learning of the requisite behaviour on the part 
of the learner, this will be selected for.
Hoppitt et  al. then apply this model to hominin evolution. Unlike other Panin 
offshoots—say, the lineage leading to contemporary chimpanzees—they argue that 
hominin ancestors encountered situations like the meerkat: a wide range of scenar-
ios where there is selective advantage to transmitting abilities and where individual 
trial-and-error learning is ineffective. As they suggest:
Unlike other apes, in humans, teaching could have been favoured by the 
requirement to transmit complicated skills and technology that are not easily 
acquired through inadvertent social learning. (Hoppitt et al., 491)
On both Hoppitt et al. and Kline’s account, one can just ‘turn the crank’; lever-
age a selective regime until an extreme instance is produced. Yet as with the ele-
phant trunk, there is an alternative story which sees human teaching as the result of 
a very specific and path dependent cascade. Telling this story involves affirming the 
uniqueness of teaching in humans. As we saw with elephants, the account begins by 
emphasizing the affordance-uniqueness of teaching in humans and then shifts to an 
idiosyncratic evolutionary cascade to explain it.
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Teaching in humans involves unique affordances.12 Notably, it requires sophis-
ticated abilities for following the intentions of others. This is fancy cognitive 
machinery for teachers and students alike. Teachers modify their behaviour with an 
awareness of the pupil’s attention, slowing down and repeating some movements, 
correcting the pupil and so forth. Moreover, pupils must be aware that the teacher is 
teaching, that their behaviours are intended to communicate information: they must 
recognise that some of the teacher’s movements are idiosyncratic, or slowed down 
and so forth and that these aspects of behaviour are not to be directly mimicked. 
In addition to the sophisticated machinery underwriting such intentional cognition, 
teaching requires affective components—an internal motivation to not only tolerate, 
but help, learners—as well as strategies for reducing the complexity of the task envi-
ronment and highlighting salient features of the task for the learner.
An alternative account of the evolution of teaching takes its unique affordances 
to be the result of a distinct path-dependent cascade (analogous to the aquatic ele-
phant hypothesis). This account links fluctuating climatic conditions with an already 
highly social species. When environments change too quickly for genetic adaptation 
to keep up—but not so fast as to make any attempt to learn about the world fruit-
less—populations can come to rely on other agents as guides to successful action 
(Boyd and Richerson,  1985; Shettleworth 2012). The initial tweaks that might have 
facilitated such a reaction may have been small: an increase in working memory, 
social tolerance (especially of infants) and attentive and orientation mechanisms 
tuned to conspecific behaviour (Tomasello 2014; Heyes 2018). But once attuned to 
other agents as a valuable source of getting by, however, powerful feedback loops 
could ratchet up the sophistication and power of such social learning (Sterelny 
2012).
Teaching fits into this narrative as a fidelity ratchet; increasing the likelihood that 
pupils could acquire similar-enough skills, behaviours and norms to those of their 
tutors. Such high-fidelity transmission might become necessary when toolmaking 
was increasingly produced through systems of distributed labour, with different 
individuals responsible for making different component parts of tools, or sequential 
steps on the same tool (Birch 2021). Decomposing production into distinct tasks 
requires concepts for keeping track of distinct production roles and the ability to 
internalize standards of correct performance. There is good reason to think that 
teaching is required especially when the skills are complex and agents have only 
partial knowledge about how their actions lead to a final product. Under such situ-
ations, teachers would have needed to guide learners in the acquisition of abilities 
and to inculcate standards for producing requisite behaviour. Steps in manufacturing 
would need to be standardized and standards would need to be instituted and main-
tained by other agents.
Here we have an account—one with a broad base of evidence from archaeology, 
paleoanthropology, primatology and psychology—that suggests that one cannot just 
12 The affordances we describe here are what the literature refers to as ‘social affordances’ (e.g. Rietveld 
2012); opportunities for behavior solicited by the social and socially-inflected aspects of the environ-
ment.
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take a meerkat and ‘turn the crank’ to get human-like teaching. Instead, the evidence 
points to distinctive features of hominin evolvability: that they were highly social, 
tool-using, cooperative and increasingly reliant on skilled labour. In other words, 
hominin capacities for teaching appear to be best explored as a path-dependent cas-
cade that sets them apart from their phylogenetic neighbours. As with the elephant 
case, we see two distinct investigative strategies adopted in light of the putative 
uniqueness of teaching. We also see that a lack of type-comparisons is no block to 
epistemic progress.
Problems and extensions
Let us take stock. We have identified a pessimistic epistemological stance towards 
explanations of putatively unique traits. Looking at the philosophical work of 
Tucker and appeals to uniqueness among scientists like Smith and Wood, we diag-
nosed this pessimism as resulting from a definitional and a methodological issue. 
Definitional in that uniqueness was defined as that which lacks comparisons; meth-
odological in that comparisons were understood solely in terms of event-type com-
parisons. From there we turned to the life sciences, finding there that scientists are 
motivated to investigate putative uniqueness using heterogeneous tools, models and 
methods—opportunistically mixing evidence from both event-type and causal-path-
way comparisons. We identified two general criteria scientists use to generate such 
comparisons and importantly, two specific kinds of evolutionary similarity. These 
allow us to give two non-overlapping characterizations of uniqueness at work in the 
life sciences. Statistical outliers are trait-bearing lineages at the extreme end of a 
general trend, while path-dependent cascades are divergent explorations of a lineage 
through evolutionary space.
This puts us in a position to draw on the case studies and argue against pessimism 
more forcefully. This we undertake the next section. In the one following, we con-
sider cases of ‘apparent uniqueness’ before concluding.
Radical pessimism
Pessimists make a claim about epistemic power and a claim about pursuit: if one 
targets unique traits, one won’t make much epistemic progress and therefore investi-
gations of unique traits will be fruitless. Both claims are mistaken.
According to Tucker, if one lacks event-type comparisons, one cannot generate 
‘acceptable scientific theories’ about the target; for Smith and Wood, a lack of event-
type comparisons makes trying to understand the evolution of our lineage an ‘unreal-
istic research question’. And yet we have seen that analyses of elephant’s trunks and 
human teaching can progress in spite of a lack of event-type comparisons. Explain-
ing human teaching as the outcome of a highly contingent, particular evolutionary 
cascade does not preclude the development of plausible, well-evidenced hypotheses. 
Paleoanthropologists lean on causal-pathway comparisons drawn from homologies, 
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ethnographic work, the material record and models from cognitive science to gen-
erate rich narratives about human teaching. As such, evolutionary uniqueness does 
not necessarily lead to epistemic pessimism. But this does not mean that optimism 
should be unbounded.
The optimist blocks the pessimist by appealing to causal-pathway comparisons. 
But what if causal-pathway comparisons are also impoverished? Jonathan Kaplan 
(2002) has argued along these lines. He claims that Homo sapiens are too phyloge-
netically isolated for good inferences about universal, unique traits:
We have no extant relatives which are suspected of sharing similar selective 
regimes and that can therefore be used to test the fitness consequences of 
the supposed adaptations. If all or most of the estimated dozen or so extinct 
hominid species (comprising, perhaps two or three genera) still existed, phy-
logenetic studies would certainly be easier and might well be useful for dis-
tinguishing between competing hypotheses about the spread and maintenance 
of phenotypic traits of interest. Unfortunately for testing adaptive hypotheses 
in humans, all the other hominids are extinct and so comparisons between the 
groups, with special attention to the fitness consequences of differences in key 
traits, are impossible (Kaplan 2002, 300).
In a nutshell, Kaplan argues that, given the radical uniqueness of hominins, 
researchers lack access to causal information that would explain the origin and diffu-
sion of salient traits.13 But note that Kaplan’s argument is restricted to certain kinds 
of adaptationist hypotheses—one may still be able to answer many other questions 
concerning human evolution—and that he is restricting himself to certain kinds of 
token-causal-comparisons, namely, homologous comparisons from other extinct 
taxa. But it may be that other kinds of proxies can be used to fill in gaps in the 
story—artefacts and other archaeological remains, say. Moreover, his argument is 
contingent on future discoveries: indeed, in the decade and a half since his paper, 
there have been several remarkable finds leading to an increasingly bushy hominin 
clade (H. floresiensis and the Denisovans, for example, see: Brown 2004; Krause 
et al. 2010). Finally, pessimism of Kaplan’s stripe potentially makes a parallel error 
to Smith and Wood’s. Where the latter ignore causal-pathway comparisons, the for-
mer ignores event-type comparisons. Even if one lacks a rich phylogenetic basis for 
identifying comparisons with our lineages, it does not follow that event-type com-
parisons are epistemically inert (for instance, see: Emery 2006; Sayers and Lovejoy, 
2008; Currie 2013).
From Kaplan’s arguments, one can identify an extreme version of uniqueness 
where both sufficient causal-pathway and event-type comparisons are lacking. 
In such a circumstance, it is unclear what evidential grounding one might have in 
understanding our target. Nonetheless we maintain that the inference from putative 
13 Lewontin has expressed similar pessimism derived from a lack of causal-pathway comparisons: “His-
tory and evolution is a form of history, simply does not leave sufficient traces, especially when it is the 
forces that are at issue. Form and even behavior may leave fossil remains, but forces like Natural Selec-
tion do not” (1988, 132).
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uniqueness to ‘unrealistic research questions’ is far too quick: it gets the direction of 
investigation backwards.
Smith and Wood infer from our lineage’s uniqueness to pursuit being unjusti-
fied. However, as we’ve seen, establishing the uniqueness or otherwise of elephant’s 
trunks requires a complex array of investigative approaches. Scientists consider 
several coarse-grained definitions of the trait—is it a proboscis like a tapir, a soft 
mouth-part like a giraffe’s tongue, or a snorkel?—and these definitions are tested 
in various ways. The process of identifying uniqueness involves stages of empirical 
investigation. In human teaching, we see both the development of coarse-grained 
functional definitions of teaching which ground comparative work across taxa, hap-
pening in parallel with more human-focused approaches which knit together various 
strands of causal-pathway evidence.
In short, one cannot know about the uniqueness of a trait independently of an 
investigation of that trait and so suggesting that putative uniqueness is a reason 
against pursuit is a mistake. Putative uniqueness is the beginning of a rich set of 
investigative practices, not a reason to avoid those questions. And indeed, even if 
the trait in question—be it teaching or trunks—end up being radically unique in our 
sense, the indirect results of pursuing those explanations are clearly rich. After all, 
discovering that a trait is indeed unique raises the question of why: what is it about 
the lineage in question that allowed the trait to emergence and what did other line-
ages lack?
Thus, both inferring from evolutionary uniqueness to pessimism is unfounded 
and so is inferring from putative uniqueness to a lack of pursuit-worthiness.
Apparent uniqueness and revisability
One might object that our account is limited: that it misses attributing uniqueness to 
cases where it should and attributes uniqueness to cases where it shouldn’t.
Consider polyploidy—whole genome duplication—in plants. Polyploidy can 
occur via a number of routes but tends to bring a common syndrome of effects: 
plants tend to grow more slowly, produce larger seeds, flower later and live longer. 
Among angiosperms, there are also often exaggerated changes to the size and shape 
of reproductive organs as well as increased production of alkaloid chemicals—shift-
ing the relationship between plants and their pollinators and pests (Levin 1983). 
The effects of polyploidization can be dramatic, should one therefore treat them as 
unique?
As we’ve argued, uniqueness attributions are description-dependent and interest-
relative. As such, there is latitude to treat any trait as unique and investigate them 
as such. Yet when the dramatic set of traits described above occurs, we think it will 
often be more illuminating to situate such traits in the well-understood event-type 
comparison class of polyploidy. For despite being the outcome of multiple, low-
probability events, polyploidy is a widespread and common event in plant evolu-
tion, being particularly common among angiosperms and even more common 
amongst crop plants. Polyploidy can even be induced in many plants through chemi-
cal applications, such as colchicine (Curry 2016). So although polyploidy’s effects 
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are dramatic—and do not result in the same effects among all species (Soltis et al. 
2015)—we think such traits are better situated in well understood event-type gener-
alizations of hybridization, unreduced gamete formation and developmental plastic-
ity. Or to put it another way, the recurrent syndrome of traits associated with poly-
ploidy is not well explored by treating any particular instance as a statistical outlier 
or a path-dependent cascade.
Contrast this with another evolutionary process that produces striking, single-
case occurrences of traits: the selective survival and extinction of lineage members. 
Perhaps proboscises evolved multiple times throughout the mammalian clade, but 
it just so happens that due to unlucky circumstances, only the elephant lineage was 
successful and persisted over time. Should we attribute uniqueness to the elephant 
trunk under these circumstances?
For all we know, there are many such cases: lineage extinction is fairly com-
mon and the fossil record is extraordinarily patchy. But we would disagree with 
any attempt that moves from speculative reasoning to a general resistance towards 
uniqueness attributions. Consider that the case requires that one has knowledge of 
non-elephantine mammals with trunks, but these mammals left no material traces in 
the fossil record and indeed, no trace evidence from which current scientists could 
deduce their existence. Under such circumstance, the question is motivated by an 
impossible epistemological situation: knowledge of a distribution despite lacking 
evidence for such knowledge.
Our knowledge of the past is incomplete. But we should not have to rely on 
omniscience in order to make uniqueness attributions. Instead, what our account 
makes room for is the revisability of such attributions. Further digging into the fossil 
record and finer-grained biological surveys may reveal that instances of seemingly 
unique traits turn out to be more widespread. In fact, we would be surprised if this 
did not turn out to be the case. Such discoveries would allow researchers to revise 
(or entrench) their uniqueness attributions.
In short, we don’t see either case as undermining our revised understanding of 
uniqueness attributions. There are striking singulars in the evolutionary record. 
Some of these will have been the result of systematic, well-understood evolutionary 
processes like polyploidy. But more generally, singulars point towards the need for 
epistemic humility—and the need to be open to revising uniqueness attributions in 
the face of new evidence.
Conclusion
Life scientists—particularly those interested in hominin evolution—make unique-
ness attributions and recognize that these come freighted with epistemic conse-
quences. Nonetheless, with few exceptions, philosophers of science have avoided 
tackling the notion of uniqueness head on. In this paper, we have shown that an 
evolutionary account of uniqueness can both make sense of scientists’ appeals to the 
concept and that many have drawn pessimistic conclusions far too quickly. Even if 
a trait lacks both type-event comparisons and causal-pathways comparisons, find-
ing this out involves a complex set of empirical and theoretical investigations which 
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often bear surprising fruit. Uniqueness ought to motivate—not disincentivise—sci-
entific study.
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